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Shining the 'Spotlight of Pitiless
Publicity' on Foreign Lobbyists?
Evaluating the Impact of the Lobbying
Disclosure Act of 1995 on the Foreign
Agents Registration Act
ABSTRACT

This note discusses the changes made to the Foreign
Agents Registration Act (FARA) by the Lobbying Disclosure
Act of 1995 (LDA) and evaluates the impact of those changes.
FARA's regulatory regime has long been criticized for its
loopholes. FARA's historicalfocus on foreign propagandists
has also been condemned as out of step with the modern
political environment in the United States, where foreign
"lobbyists" are seen as a serious threat to government
integrity. In response to such criticisms, the LDA endeavored
to reform FARA so as to increase compliance levels among
foreign lobbyists seeking to influence the U.S. political
process. The changes made to FARA in this reform effort
include: important "definitional"changes, the elimination of
the lawyer exemption to FARA, and needed improvements in
the registration process itself. The author concludes that,
while the reforms are laudable and have the potential for
bringing more foreign lobbyists under FARA's regulatory
imperative, until thefurther steps of bolstering the ranks and
enforcement powers of the FARA administrators are taken,
the ideal of a comprehensively-enforced FARA will remain
elusive.
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I. INTRODUCTION

The Foreign Agents Registration Act' (FARA) was enacted in
1938 to lessen the negative impact of foreign propagandists on
1.
Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938, ch. 327, 52 Stat. 631 (codified
as amended at 22 U.S.C. §§ 611-21 (1990 & Supp. 1996) (hereinafter FARA). The
purpose of FARA was stated clearly in a 1942 amendment to its provisions:
It is hereby declared to be the policy and purpose of this Act to protect the
national defense, internal security, and foreign relations of the United
States by requiring public disclosure by persons engaging in propaganda
activities and other activities for or on behalf of foreign governments,
foreign political parties, and other foreign principals so that the

Government and the people of the United States may be informed of the
identity of such persons and may appraise their statements and actions In
light of their associations and activities.
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U.S. external and internal policies. Such propaganda was seen as
potentially "increas[ing] racial and religious discord, subvert[ing]
the democratic process, and dominat[ing] the nation's foreign
policy decisionmaking with foreign agendas."2 FARA sought to
forestall such dire consequences by requiring that purveyors of
such propaganda label their information and register with official
agencies. 3 However, the focus of FARA has changed over the
years as the perceived source of threats to the internal security of
the United States has changed.4
FARA's primary purpose is to limit the power and influence of

sophisticated foreign lobbyists on the U.S. political process. 5 All
lobbyists suffer from the widespread perception that their
profession is populated by silver-tongued manipulators of
governmental processes. In the case of foreign lobbyists, who are
necessarily external to the U.S. national interests and its
legislative process in particular, such mistrust may often be well
placed. 6 In fact, through various amendments to FARA, Congress

Act of Apr. 29, 1942, ch. 263, 56 Stat. 248-49 (current version at 22 U.S.C. § 611
(1990)).
2.
Mark B. Baker, Updating the ForeignAgents RegistrationAct to Meet the
CurrentEconomic Threat To National Security, 25 TEX. INT'L L. J. 23, 24 (1990). At
its inception, FARA was aimed primarily at Nazi propaganda. After World War II,
it was used to monitor Communist propaganda throughout the period of the Cold
War. Id. at 25.
3.
FARA, 22 U.S.C. §§ 611-21 (1990). Such registration was not intended
to preclude the introduction of such propaganda in the United States, but to allow
the people of the United States to fairly assess the material in light of its origin.
Phillip J. Perry, Note, Recently ProposedReforms to the ForeignAgents Registration
Act, 23 CORNELL INT'L L. J. 133, 144-45 (1990). See also Baker, supra note 2, at
24 (indicating Congress's intent not to prohibit the propaganda altogether (for fear
that the censorship would be considered anti-democratic), but rather requiring
disclosure of a disseminator's ultimate supporter so that recipients would be able
to consider the biased source of propaganda when evaluating its merits.").
4.
This focal shift occurred owing to changing goals of the foreign powers
attempting to influence U.S. policies. See Baker, supra note 2, at 25 (noting that
instead of seeking to subvert the sovereignty of the United States, foreign entities
were seeking to exploit the U.S. political process for economic gain). See also
Brian C. Castello, Note, The Voice of Government as an Abridgement of First
Amendment Rights of Speakers: Rethinking Meese v. Keene, 1989 DuKE L. J. 654,
657 ("FARA's purpose shifted over time, however, from that of exposing
subversive propagandizing to spotlighting political lobbying and public relations
directed at U.S. policy making.").

5.

See, e.g., Odile Prevot, A New Concern In Europe: Lobbylsts, the

Merchants of Influence, 5 TRANSNAT'L LAw. 305, 312-13 (1992) (noting the recent

focus on powerful lobbyists in Washington and asserting: "[There is no question
that lobbyists . . . are having an effect on politics and policy [in the United
Statesl.").
6.
One particularly egregious example will suffice to demonstrate the
dangers of unrestrained foreign lobbying. In 1980, a Toshiba subsidiary, Toshiba
Machine Co., began to sell precision machine tools to the Soviet Union to produce
"quieter" submarine propellers despite the fact that these tools were on a list of
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has identified the actions of these professional lobbyists, dealing
directly with elected and appointed government officials, as posing

the greatest threat to government integrity. 7

Nonetheless,

loopholes exist in FARA's regulatory scheme, which have been
exploited by lobbyists for the past few decades. Various attempts
to reform FARA have been made over the years.8 Despite several
amendments, 9 FARA is considered porous in numerous areas and
susceptible to the wiles of foreign lobbyists.
On July 25, 1995, the U.S. Senate passed a reform

measure-1995 S. '1060-that sought to limit the ability of agents

of foreign principals to take advantage of the weaknesses of FARA.
1 °
The U.S. House of Representatives passed an identical version

.prohibited exports" promulgated by the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral
Security Controls, an informal organization seeking to restrict the sale of military
goods and technology to non-member nations. Baker, supra note 2, at 30.
Efforts by Toshiba to maintain the secrecy of these transactions failed and their
discovery sparked a congressional outcry to ban all imports from Toshiba for two
to five years. Such a sanction would have resulted in a loss to Toshiba of
approximately ten billion dollars a year in lost sales to the United States. Id. at
31. Toshiba immediately launched "one of the costliest and most aggressive
lobbying campaigns ever mounted by a foreign company.. ." through its wholly
owned subsidiary, Toshiba America, Inc. Id. (quoting Toshiba Corp. PaidLobbyists
Millions to Soften Sanctions, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 13, 1988, § IV, at 1. available In
LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File). Using a combination of three law firms and a
public relations group, a Toshiba-funded damage control team issued a report
finding Toshiba itself uninvolved in the sale by its subsidiary, Toshiba Machine,
while subsequently organizing a letter writing campaign, running full-page
advertisements in major newspapers, holding news conferences, and working the
halls of Congress. Id. As a result of this Intense lobbying, the only penalty
imposed on Toshiba was a three-year restriction on U.S. government purchases of
Toshiba products, with exemptions for national security as well as for other
reasons. Id. at 31-32. The estimated costs of Toshiba's actions to the United
States ranged from eight billion to over one-hundred billion dollars, a cost to be
born by U.S. taxpayers. Id. at 32. Even more damaging, however, was the
impact of the Toshiba scandal on U.S. national security. Id. Such an example
reveals the precarious nature of U.S. policy in the face of organized, well-financed
foreign lobbying efforts and the extent to which such efforts can succeed, even in
a highly sensitive area such as national defense.
7.
See Karim G. Lynn, Note, Unconstitutional Inhibitions: Political
Propagandaand the Foreign Agents RegistrationAct 33 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 345,
353 (1988).
8.
The most recent effort to enact a lobbying disclosure bill was defeated
in 1994 due to controversial provisions contained in the bill. The bill would have
mandated the creation of a completely new enforcement agency, civil fines of up
to $200,000 for violations of FARA, and disclosure by lobbyists of the specific
congressional committees contacted. T. R. Goldman, Why Lobbyists Can Live With
New Bill, N.J. L.J., Dec. 11, 1995, at 13, available In LEXIS, Njlaws Library, NJ
LAWS File.
9.
See Infra Part II.B.
10.
The House originally considered adding four amendments to the
Senate bill, but these amendments were defeated on November 28, 1995.
Sponsors of the bill urged the defeat of all the amendments, regardless of merit,
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of this bill, the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995 (LDA), on
November 29, 1995.11 On December 19, 1995, President Clinton

signed the bill,' 2 stating that he "ha[d] strongly supported the
purposes and principles embodied in13 this legislation since the
beginning of... [his] Administration."
Section II of this Note first examines FARA,its history and its
interpretation in the courts, and discusses commonly cited
problems in FARA's administration. Section III describes past
attempts to reform FARA, as well as reforms that were proposed
prior to the new bill. Section IV examines the provisions of the
Senate bill recently enacted into law and evaluates its efficacy in
light of the perceived shortcomings of FARA and the reforms
previously proposed.
This Note concludes that despite the
positive impact the reforms embodied in the LDA may have on
increasing registration under FARA, the failure of the LDA to
address the persistent problem of FARA administrators'
inadequate staff levels, and the need for greater enforcement
powers to ensure continuing compliance, will significantly
undermine the efficacy of such reforms.

II. FARA-LEGISLATIvE HISTORY

A. General Provisions
Enacted in 1938, FARA1 4 sought to deter the spread of

propaganda

by

foreign

propagandists, 15

particularly

those

lest the bill be sent back to the Senate and face an uncertain future. Because the
House bill was then identical to the Senate bill, it could be sent immediately to
the President for signing without a House-Senate conference. Lobbying, House
Passes Lobby Reform, Bill Headed for White House, 1995 DAILY REP. FOR
ExEcuTIVES 230, Nov. 21, 1995. availablein LEXIS, Exec Library, Drexec File.
11.
House Passes Lobby Reform Bill; Sponsors Expect White House
Approval, 48 INT'L T. REP. (BNA) 2017, 2017-18 (1995).
12.
Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995, 2 U.S.C. §§ 1601-12 (Supp. 1996).
13.
Text of PresidentialStatement on Approval of Lobbying DisclosureAct of
1995, U.S. NEwswPE, Dec. 19, 1995, 17:39 Eastern Time, available in LEXIS,
News Library, Curnws File. As evidence of this support President Clinton stated:
During my first days in office, I barred all top executive branch officials
from lobbying their agencies for five years after leaving office and from ever
lobbying for foreign governments.
During the 103rd Congress, my
Administration lent its strong support to congressional backers of
legislation that served as the model for the Lobbying Disclosure Act of
1995.
14.

FARA, 22 U.S.C. §§ 611-21 (1990).
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promulgating pro-Nazi 16 and pro-Communist 17 literature. 1 8 The
concern was that these persons were "representing foreign
governments or foreign political groups ...[and were] supplied by
such foreign agencies with funds .

.

. [for the purpose of]

influenc[ing] the external and internal policies of [the United
States]."' 9 FARA aimed to counteract the effects of subversive
propaganda, not by limiting the information that could be
disseminated, but by requiring that the disseminator of the
foreign propaganda register with the Secretary of State and label
its source. 20 It was felt that U.S. citizens could make an informed
decision, as to the accuracy of the information, if they knew both
the identity of the foreign
agents spreading it and the source of
21
the propaganda itself.

15.
Lynn, supra note 7, at 346. The enactment of FARA in the critical
period preceding the outbreak of World War II was the result of recommendations
set forth by a special committee investigating "un-American" activities in the
United States. Id. at 345 n.7 (citing H.R. REP. No. 153, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 25
(1935)). This committee was called the "McCormack Committee" and was
established to investigate the infusion of Nazi and other propaganda. Id.
16.
Id. at 345 n. 7. See also Michael I. Spak. Americafor Sale: When WellConnected Former FederalOfficials Peddle Their Influence to the Highest Bidder, 78
KY. L. J. 237, 242-43 (1990) (citing H.R. RES. 198, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 78 CONG.
REc. 4934, 4949 (1934) (illustrating that the words "foreign propaganda" in FARA
originally read "Nazi Propaganda")).

An example of the pro-Nazi activity of that era was the publishing in the
United States of a newspaper called the Silver Ranger which advocated the
"reorganization of the United States government to further pro-Nazi goals." Id. at
243. Additionally, during World War I, U.S. residents routinely received
literature on anti-semitism and the eventual German victory, material that was
not labeled and which appeared to have been circulated as "'a bit of American
comment.'" Robert G. Waters, Note, The Foreign Agents Registration Act: How
Open Should The Marketplace of Ideas Be?. 53 Mo. L. REv. 795, 799 (1988).
17.
See Lynn, supra note 7, at 350 n.24 (reporting on amendments to the
definitional section of FARA made in 1950 where the Committee on Un-American
Activities articulated the purpose of the statute as aiding American people in their
understanding of the true character, aims, and techniques of the communist
conspiracy.) (citing H.R. REP. No. 81-2980, at 1, reprinted In 1950 U.S. CODE
CONG. SERV.3891).

18.
Id. See also Farrokh Jhabvala, Note, The "PoliticalPropaganda"Label
Under FARA: Abridgement of Free Speech or Legitimate Regulation?, 41 U. MIAMI L.
REv. 591, 591 (1987) ("Concern within the county had been mounting over the
activities of foreign propagandists, particularly Nazi, fascist, and communist, and
FARA sought to unmask these agents and provide for official and public
surveillance of their activities.").
19.
Spak, supra note 16, at 242.
20.
Id. at 243.
21.
Id. at 243-44. See also Pamela Sirkin, Comment, The Evanescent Actus
Reus Requirement CaliforniaPenal Code § 647 (d)- Criminal Llabilityfor "Loitering
With Intent... "Is PunshmentforMerely Thinking Certain Thoughts While Loitering
Constitutional?, 19 Sw. U. L. REv. 165, 189 n. 142 (1990) (noting that Justice
Stevens, writing for the Court in Meese v. Keene, 481 U.S. 465, argued that FARA
was not a mechanism designed to suppress the material, but rather was an
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The ultimate purpose of FARA, as stated by Congress, was

the "protect[ion] of [the] internal security, national defense, and
foreign relations of the United States."2 2 This purpose would be
advanced, it was thought, if the government and people of the
United States were informed of the "associations and activities" of
those engaged in propagandist activity. 2 3 It was only through
shining this "spotlight of pitiless publicity" that the people of the
United States could identify those "engaged in . . . spread[ingl
doctrines alien to our democratic form of government" and act in
an informed manner to mitigate the "pernicious" nature of their
24
actions.
In its original enactment, FARA required an "agent of a
foreign principal ' 25 to register with the Secretary of State. 26 As
the administrator of FARA, the Secretary of State was responsible
for obtaining registration and supplemental statements of
registrants. 27 The Secretary of State was also given the authority
to bring criminal charges against those failing to comply with the

instrument for putting the material into the proper perspective so the public
could better evaluate its import.).
22.
Lynn, supra note 7, at 346 (citing FARA, 22 U.S.C. § 611 (1982)). See
also Waters, supra note 16, at 798-99 (noting that Congressional investigation
into subversive activities in the United States "produced 'incontrovertible
evidence' of persons operating in the United States on behalf of foreign principals
for the purpose of fostering 'un-American activities' and 'inculcating' principles
and teachings' aimed toward establishing in the United States a foreign system of
government ... ')(quoting H.R. REP. No. 75-1381, at 2 (1937)). These findings
prompted Congress to act to address such activities and, to that end, FARA was
introduced by Senator John McCormack. Id. at 799.
23.
Lynn, supra note 7, at 346 (citing 88 CONG. REc. 802 (1942)). See
Spak. supra note 16, at 244 ("FARA was designed to limit the effect of foreign
propaganda by revealing both the identity of foreign agents and the source of the
propaganda they were disseminating.").
24.
Id. (quoting H.R. REP. No. 75-1381, at 2 (1937)). See also United
States v. Auhagen, 39 F. Supp. 590 (D.D.C. 1941) (noting that if U.S. citizens
were informed as to the identity of foreign agents, they would be able to evaluate
their statements accordingly.).
25.
The term "agent of a foreign principal" included any person acting,
engaging, or agreeing to act as a "public relations counsel, publicity agent, or as
agent, servants, representative, or attorney for a foreign principal or for any
domestic organization subsidized directly or indirectly in whole or in part by a
foreign principal.". Spak, supra note 16, at 244 n.43.
26.
Id. at 244. However, the registration requirements were so poorly
enforced by the Department of State that Congress transferred these enforcement
duties to the Department of Justice in 1943. Baker, supra note 2, at 36 (citing
Hearings on H.R. 1591 Before a Subcomm. of the Comm. on the Judiciary of the
House of Representatives, 75th Cong. 1st Sess. (1937) (unpublished), reprinted In
INSTITUTE OF LIVING LAW, Combating Totalitarian Propaganda: The Method of
Exposure, 10 U. CM.L. REV. 107, 112 n.20 (1943).
27.
Spak, supra note 16, at 244.
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requirements of FARA, which carried penalties of a jail term, a
28
fine, or both.

In addition to registration, the original FARA also required
that "political propaganda"

be filed 2 9

and labeled 30

if the

registered agent employed interstate or foreign commerce or used
the mails to disseminate the material. 3 1 "Political propaganda"
was defined under FARA as:
any oral, visual, graphic, written, pictorial, or other communication
or expression .

.

. which is reasonably adapted to, or which the

person disseminating the same believes will, or which he intends
to, prevail upon, indoctrinate, convert, induce, or in any other way
influence a recipient or any section of the public within the United
States with reference to the political or public interests, policies, or
relations of a government of a foreign country or a foreign political
party or with reference to the foreign policies of the United States
or promote in the United States racial, religious, or social
dissensions .... 32

The label of "political propaganda" was applied in one of two
ways. 33 First, the agent could determine that the material to be
distributed fell within that definition. Second, an employee of the
Justice Department could make such a determination. Once the
material was identified as "political propaganda," a statement was
to be attached to the material, providing the following
information:
(1) the relationship or connection between the person transmitting
the "political propaganda" and the propaganda; (2) the status of the

person transmitting the "political propaganda" as an agent of a
foreign principal who is registered with the Justice Department (3)
the name and address of the foreign agent; and (4) a statement that
the registration required by IFARA does not indicate approval by
the United States Government of the contents of the "political
34
propaganda."

28.
Id.
29.
FARA, 22 U.S.C. § 614(a) (1990).
30.
Id. at § 614(b). See also Waters, supra note 16, at 796 (noting that,
under this section of FARA, political propaganda was not to be disseminated
without being "'conspicuously marked at its beginning with . .. [an] accurate
statement . . . setting forth the relationship or connection between the person
transmitting the political propaganda... and such propaganda ....
'"(quoting
22 U.S.C. § 614(b) (1982)).
31.
This section was added by amendment in 1942. Lynn, supra note 7, at
349 n.23.
32.
Id. at 350 n.24 (quoting 22 U.S.C. § 6 11(J) (1982) and noting that the
definitional section of the 1938 Act was amended as part of the Internal Security
Act of 1950, 64 Stat. 987, 989-91 (1950)).
33.
Id. at 350.
34.
Id. at 351 (citing FARA, 22 U.S.C. § 614(b) (1982)).
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Courts upheld FARA against First 3 5 and Fifth 3 6 Amendment
challenges to the registration and disclosure requirements of
FARA, as well as those to its original labeling requirement. The
U.S. Supreme Court, in Meese v. Keene,3 7 held that the use of the
term "political propaganda,"3 8 to identify the materials that must
comply with the requirements of FARA, did not burden protected
expression and thus did not violate the First Amendment. The
Court defended FARA against the charge that the term resulted in
the suppression of expression 9 due to its pejorative connotation.

"The statutory term is a neutral one, and in any event, the
Department of Justice makes no public announcement that the
materials are 'political propaganda."' 40 The Court also noted that

35.

It was argued that the registration requirements of FARA were an

unconstitutional restraint on the dissemination of ideas. See U.S. v. Peace
Information Center. 97 F. Supp. 255 (D.D.C. 1951). Peace Information Center
was indicted on a charge of violating FARA, in failing to register as an agent of a
foreign principal. Individual defendants were also charged, in their capacity as
officers and directors of the Peace Information Center, with failure to cause the
latter to register. The defendants moved to dismiss the indictment, contending
that the statute was unconstitutional. In holding that FARA did not violate the
First Amendment, the Court stated, "The statute under consideration neither
limits nor interferes with freedom of speech. It does not regulate expression of
ideas. Nor does it preclude the making of any utterances. It merely requires
persons carrying on certain activities to identify themselves by filing a registration
statement." Id. at 262. Regarding the Fifth Amendment argument, the Court
noted that:

[t]he privilege against self-incrimination is... personal to the individual
and may be either asserted or waived by him. It does not constitute a
basis for invalidating a statute . . . . Moreover, the statute does not
require the disclosure of any information except on a voluntary basis as a
condition of carrying on certain occupations or certain activities. [T]he
information called for by the statute is not incriminating on its face.
Id. at 263.
36.
FARA was stated to violate the privilege against self-incrimination
conferred by the Fifth Amendment. See Id. at 255; see also supra note 35
(indicating the Court's ruling on this issue); Atty. Gen. v. Irish Northern Aid
Committee, 530 F. Supp. 241 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (upholding the facial validity of
FARA against a First Amendment challenge).
37.
481 U.S. 465 (1987).
38.
FARA, 22 U.S.C. § 6110) (1990).
39.
See Andrew P. Thomas. Easing the Pressure on Pressure Groups:
Toward a ConstitutionalRight to Lobby, 16 HARV. J. L. & PUB. PoL'y 149, 153 n.34
(1993). The Meese Court recognized that, in fact, the statute provided for more
speech rather than less. The Court noted that Congress was requiring "the
disseminators of such [labeled] material to make additional disclosures that would
better enable the public to evaluate the import of the propaganda." 481 U.S. at
480 (emphasis added).
40.
481 U.S. at 479 n.14. See also Block v. Meese, 793 F.2d 1303 (D.C.
Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1021 (1986) (rejecting a challenge to the
constitutionality of the classification of certain films as "political propaganda."
The Court declared that:
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"[although] [t]here is a risk that a partially informed audience
might believe that a film that must be registered with the
Department of Justice is suspect .

. .,

there is no evidence that

this suspicion-to the degree it exists-has had the effect of
Government censorship. ' 4 1 The Court declared that its duty was
simply to "construe legislation as it is written, not as it might be
read by a layman." The Court continued, "we simply view this
particular choice of language, statutorily defined in a neutral and
evenhanded manner, as one that 4no
constitutional provision
2
prohibits the Congress from making."

[E]ven if classification as 'propaganda' constituted an expression of official
government disapproval of the ideas in question, neither precedent nor
reason would justify us in finding such an expression in itse!f
unlawful.... If the first amendment considers speakers to be so timid, or
important ideas to be so fragile, that they are overwhelmed by knowledge
of governmental disagreement, then it is hard to understand why official
governmental action, which speaks infinitely louder than words, does not
constantly disrupt the first amendment 'marketplace.'
Id. at 1312-1313.
41.
481 U.S. at 484. See also Viereck v. United States, 318 U.S. 236, 251
(1943) (dissenting on separate and unrelated grounds), Justice Black noted that
FARA was not only constitutionally sound, but also promoted First Amendment
freedoms:
Resting on the fundamental constitutional principle that our people,
adequately informed, may be trusted to distinguish between the true and
the false, the bill is intended to label information of foreign origin so that
hearers and readers may not be deceived by the belief that the information
comes from a disinterested source. Such legislation implements rather
than detracts from the prized freedoms guaranteed by the First
Amendment.
Id. Cf. Jhabvala, supra note 18, at 622-25 (noting that "[t]he true impact of the

label on the plaintiffs first amendment right.. must be assessed by its practical
impact [which will be to] inhibit[] and deter[] both speakers and listeners from
disseminating and receiving [the messages contained in the labeled material].").
42.
481 U.S. at 484.
See also Stephen J. Kim, Comment, "Viewer
Discretion Is Advised": A Structural Approach to the Issue of Television Violence,
142 U. PA. L. REv. 1383 (1994). Kim notes that, in rejecting the argument that
the public's likely negative reaction to the label "political propaganda" made such
a labeling requirement unconstitutional, the Meese Court declared that the
appropriate response by those required to label their materials would be to
counter with more speech:
Congress simply required the disseminators of such material to make
additional disclosures that would better enable the public to evaluate the
import of the propaganda. The statute does not prohibit appellee from
advising his audience that the films have not been officially censured in
any way. Disseminators of propaganda may go beyond the disclosures
required by statute and add any further information they think germane to
the public's viewing of the materials. By compelling some disclosure of
information and permitting more, the Act's approach recognizes that the

1996]

FOREIGNLOBBYISTS AND THE LDA

1161

B. Amendments to the ForeignAgents RegistrationAct
FARA has been amended eight times by Congress. 43 It was
first amended in 194244 to "close up certain loopholes." 45 To that
end, the terms "foreign principal" and "foreign agent" were
The 1942 amendments
expanded by these amendments. 4 6
required agents of a foreign principal (private or government) to:
(1) report each dissemination of political material in the interest of
a foreign principal to the Internal Security Division of the Justice
Department; (2) label the disseminated material as foreign political
propaganda; and (3) file with the Department of Justice the names

best remedy for misleading or inaccurate speech contained within
materials subject to the Act is fair, truthful, and accurate speech.
Id. at 1410 (quoting Meese v. Keene, 481 U.S. at 480-481) (footnotes and citations
omitted). Cf. Beth Orsoff, Note, Government Speech as Government Censorship,
67 S. CAL. L. REv. 229, 241-42 (1993) (rejecting the notion that the term "political
propaganda" is neutral and asserting that:
The only way the Court could reach this conclusion was to limit its
analysis to the statutory definition of "political propaganda" [in FARA, for
example, "those expressive materials that must comply with the Act's
registration, filing, and disclosure requirements," 481 U.S. at 4671 . . .
[whilel ignorling] the reality that the public perceives "political
propaganda" as negative or even un-American speech.)
Id. at 241-242; Brad R. Roth, The FirstAmendment in the ForeignAffairs Realm:
"Domesticating"the Restrictions on Citizen Participation,2 TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTs. L.
REv. 255, 265 (1993) (asserting that FARA "has a chilling effect on political
participation that potentially goes far beyond the stigmatization brought on by the
Act's application.").
Lynn, supra note 7, at 352.
43.
44.
Spak. supra note 16, at 244. See also Castello, supra note 4. at 657
n.22 ("The 1942 amendments were intended to remedy inadequate and
inconsistent enforcement of the original disclosure procedures." It was at this
time that Congress expanded the definitions of foreign principals and created the
"political propaganda" definition.) (citing Act of April 29, 1942, ch. 263, § 1, 1(b),
(J),
56 Stat. 248, 249-51 (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. § 611 (1982))) (first
citation omitted).
45.
Spak, supra note 16, at 244. See also Ronald C. Brown, East-West
Labor Union Cooperation;Falling Walls and Opening Doors: Communism, Cold War
Era Barriers, and the Immigration Act of 1990, 7 AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 1, 16
(1991) (indicating that the goal of the 1942 amendments which mandated
disclosure statements deeming the dissemination of alien ideologies 'political
propaganda,' was to "counter propaganda sent to the United States by the Axis

powers of Germany, Italy, and Japan.").
The term "foreign principal" was
46.
Spak, supra note 16, at 245.
expanded to include a corporation or person controlled by a foreign principal.
The term "foreign agent" was expanded to include foreign military personnel.
Newspapers not controlled by a foreign interest were excluded. Id.
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47
disseminated.

to whom

the

material was

FARA was amended both in 195048 and 1961.4 9 The most
significant amendments, however, were those made in 1966,50
which had the primary goal of changing the focus of FARA 5 1 to
protect the "the decision making process of our Government" from
the efforts of foreign agents to influence U.S. policies, foreign and
domestic. This was to be done through the use of "techniques
outside the normal diplomatic channels."5 2 With this shift In
focus, FARA evolved from an anti-propagandist tool into an
instrument of "modern regulatory control over the sophisticated
lobbying activities of foreign agents." 5 3 In the articulate phrase of

one observer regarding the modern purpose of FARA, "The world

is teetering on the brink of peace, and the rise of
global markets
5 4
has forced a need for national economic security."

47.
Burt Neuborne & Steven R. Shapiro, National Security and the First
Amendment- The Nylon Curtain: America's National Border and the Free Flow of
Ideas, 26 WM. & MARY L. REv. 719, 735-36 (1985).
48.
Pub. L. No. 81- 642, 64 Stat. 399 (1950).
49.
Pub. L. No. 87-366. 75 Stat. 784 (1961).
50.
Congress began its work to change FARA in 1963. Spak, supra note
16, at 246. Their efforts did not bear fruit, however, until 1966 when the
proposed amendments passed both houses of Congress. See Pub. L. No. 89-486,
80 Stat. 244 (1966) (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. § 611 (1990)).
51.
In 1962, foreign powers lobbied the U.S. Congress to take steps to
safeguard their sugar quotas. In response, Congress amended FARA In 1966,
changing the coverage of FARA by including "[the] lobbying [of government
offfcials and by adding commercial activities to the registration requirements."
Baker, supra note 2, at 25 (citing FARA, 22 U.S.C. § 611(o) (1982)).
52.
Lynn, supranote 7, at 352 (citing S. REP. No. 89-143, at 4 (1965)). See
also Roth, supra note 42, at 261-62 (noting that "the Act's 1966 amendment
expanded FARA's initial purpose beyond exposure of foreign-sponsored

subversion to exposure of lobbying by foreign entities eager to Influence U.S.

policies to suit their economic and political interests.").
53.
Spak. supra note 16, at 242. See also Castello, supra note 4, at 657
(noting that FARA's current focus on "political lobbying and public relations
directed at U.S. policymaking" has "expanded the burden on foreign principals by
adding labeling and filing requirements for materials distributed in the U.S.").
54.
Baker, supra note 2, at 24 (emphasis deleted). The threat to the
United States is seen by Baker as no longer coming from subversives
promulgating propaganda, but from formidable economic competitors such as
Japan. Id.
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C. Shortcomings of FARA
Despite numerous attempts to correct existing problems in
the administration of FARA, weaknesses remain. 55 The
deficiencies of FARA fall into three general areas.5 6 First, there is
"practical
problem
related
both
to
a
noncompliance
difficult[ies]," 5 7 and to a "structural insensitivity" to the "extent of
58
current violations and the number of potential violators."
Second, the structure of FARA produces "adverse incentives" for
Third, FARA does not
compliance with its requirements.5 9
who must register and who is
possess bright-line rules specifying
60
exempt under its provisions.
In addition to the aforementioned deficiencies, the disclosure
requirement may lack the bite it was originally intended to
possess due to FARA's current focus on lobbying activity, as
opposed to its original target of subversive propaganda. 6 ' In fact,
while disclosure was presumed to harm the purveyors of
pernicious propaganda, it is the identity of the agent that is vital
to lobbying success today, particularly in the case of former
officials who work for foreign interests. In such instances, former
officials "gain advantage not from anonymity [as did the previous
propagandists,] but rather from familiarity."6 2 Because FARA

55.
The words of one Congressional member regarding the 1966
amendments remain applicable today: "[The Foreign Agents Registration Act of
1938] has proved inadequate [in regulating] the various subtle forms of
persuasion and missionary work on behalf of foreign principals to which we have
been subjected in more recent years." 112 CONG. REc. 10,537 (1966) (Statement
of Rep. Celler).
56.
Perry, supranote 3,at 144-45.
57.
Spak, supra note 16, at 275, 277 (acknowledging in particular the
difficulty created by poor staffing levels available to ensure that FARA's reporting
requirements are adequately enforced).
58.
Perry. supra note 3. at 146 (noting a 1980 GAO report that "reflected
the Justice Department's concern that [the number of agents actually registered].
. represented only 'the tip of the iceberg' ana that many non-exempt agents were
functioning without detection.").
Id. at 144, 147.
59.
60.
Id. at 144-45.
61.
See Spak, supra note 16, at 274:
Foreign propagandists, before 1938, were able to gain an advantage due to
the fact that they were often strangers to their audience. Thus, they could
appear to be merely concerned ordinary citizens when making statements
on behalf of foreign benefactors. FARA took away this advantage from
foreign propagandists by making them known to their audience as foreign
agents.
62.
Id. "The familiarity that former officials have with ex-colleagues in the
federal service is their greatest asset. Former officials can navigate through
bureaucratic channels far easier than others who routinely deal with federal
agencies." Id.
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does not remove any advantage from such officials, it Is unable to
prevent former government officials from "exercising undue
influence" upon6 3their former agency colleagues on behalf of
foreign interests.
1. The Problem of Continuing Noncompliance
Noncompliance with FARA is reportedly due, in part, to the
practical difficulties of enforcing an act that covers a potentially
large number of parties. In 1989, the Justice Department had
registered a mere 832 out of a countless number of agents who
lobby for foreign governments and foreign private interests before
the U.S. government. 64 Inadequate staffing of the Foreign Agents
Registration Office comprises one reason for the incomplete
monitoring of compliance that has become the norm under
FARA. 65 One commentator has noted, "This understaffing begs
the question of how seriously the federal government has
considered the potential problems
of foreign agents operating
66
anonymously in this country."
Noncompliance is also traceable to the FARA administrators'
ignorance as to the identity and number of improperly registered
agents, which stems principally from the "self-policing" nature of
FARA's exemptions. 6 7 Because the exemption is self-determined,

63.
Id. at 275. To wit. "fTormer officials have a great deal of confidential
information that is most valuable to their new employers. They have substantial
contacts within the agency, understand its procedures, and know how to shape
arguments for presentation based on the informal practices and standards of the
agency." Id. at 274.
64.
Id. at 275 (noting further that, with this low number of agents
registering, "it does not take a vivid imagination to surmise that many foreign
agents are not registering their activities as required under FARA.").
65.
Id. The author noted that "[hlistorically, the FARA office has had
between six and seventeen persons working for it, including attorneys, paralegals,
and clerical personnel." He concluded that "[sleventeen people [do] not seem to
be enough to accomplish the mission of FARA." Id. at 275-276 (citations and
footnotes omitted).
66.
Id. at 276. In addition, Spak noted that for over twenty-five years. a
congressional committee had criticized "the staffing of the FARA office as
inadequate to handle the thorough processing of all registration statements." Id.
FBI research into registration levels uncovered "discrepancies, omissions, and
inconsistencies that the FARA staff had overlooked." Id. Nonetheless, "[tloday,
there are roughly the same number of attorneys in the FARA office." Id. (citations
and footnotes omitted).
67.
Perry, supra note 3, at 146; see also William P. Fuller, S.J.,
Congressional Lobbying Disclosure Laws: Much Needed Reforms on the Horizon,
17 SEroN HALL LEGIS. J. 419, 436 (1993) (concluding that "Islince the regulation is
'self-policing' in the sense that 'a]gents who determine they fall within an
exception to the Act need not register ... [and] ... have no affirmative obligation
to apply for an exemption,' it is hardly surprising that the Act is so often
circumvented.") (footnote omitted).
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unless the activities of the agent attract the attention of FARA
administrators in some way, the legitimacy of this self-determined
exemption is never challenged. 68 The successful application of
FARA depends on knowledge of those who are violating its
provisions. Hence, the lack of an affirmative duty on agents to
notify FARA administrators that they are relying on an
exemption 69 renders the 70effective enforcement of FARA's
provisions nearly impossible.
2. Disincentives for Compliance
The 1966 amendments to FARA were intended to broaden its
reach, bringing under its mandates "the lawyer-lobbyist and
public relations counsel whose object [was] not to subvert or
overthrow the U.S. Government, but to influence its policies to
the satisfaction of the particular client." 7 1 Although the persons

to whom the amended FARA applies often engage in perfectly legal

and non-subversive activities, the negative connotation of FARA's

original focus remains. 72 This stigma, which continues to be
acts as a
associated with registration as a "foreign agent,"
73
"significant obstacle to voluntary compliance today."
In addition, the exemptions 7 4 that exist under FARA are
confusing, allowing many agents properly within its scope to

68.
Perry, supra note 3, at 147. "Successful implementation of FARA rests
on knowledge of who is violating the Act. Without imposing an affirmative duty
on agents to notify FARA's administrators of reliance on an exemption, the shortstaffed registration unit cannot possibly enforce FARA's objectives." Id.
See infra Part II.C.2 (delineating the exceptions under FARA).
69.
Perry, supranote 3, at 147.
70.
71.
Waters, supra note 16, at 800 (citing S. REP. No. 89-143. at 4 (1965));
see also Baker. supra note 2. at 25 (noting that after World War II, FARA was
primarily used to track Communist propaganda, but that in time, "a significant
change occurred in the goals of foreign powers attempting to influence the United
States political process."). Congress responded to this change by amending FARA
in 1966 to "alte[r] the definition of 'political activities' to include lobbying
government officials and by adding commercial activities to the registration
requirements." Id.
72.
Perry, supra note 3, at 147-48 & n.95; see also Baker. supra note 2. at
39 (noting that when Congress expanded FARA's coverage to include the
"advocacy of a foreign nation's economic interests before government officials, the
negative, traitorous connotation did not disappear. The image of traitorous
foreign agents covertly promoting un-American activities remain[edl.").
73.
Perry, supra note 3, at 148 (quoting CONG. RES. SERVICE, 95th Cong.,
1st Sess., THE FOREIGN AGENTS REGISTRATION ACT 1 (Comm. Print 1977)); see also

Fuller, supra note 67, at 438 (noting FARA'S ineffectiveness can be traced in part
to the lingering stigma attached to registration: "Fearing a xenophobic backlash.
lobbyists would rather risk a light penalty for noncompliance than hazard the
chance of being pilloried in either the press or other public forums.").
74.
FARA, 22 U.S.C. §§ 613 (a)-(g) (1990).
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75
escape registration by exploiting the loose statutory language.
For example, FARA provides for eight exemptions which: (1)
exclude foreign government officials, diplomatic and consular
staff; (2) provide a commercial exemption; 76 (3) excuse agents
engaged in pursuits of a religious, scholastic, or scientific nature;
(4) focus on acts involving the defense of a foreign government
considered vital to the U.S. defense; and (5) gives the Attorney
General the
discretion to exempt any agent from the requirements
77
FARA.
of

3. Absence of Bright-Line Rules
The absence of clearly defined rules in portions of FARA's
regulatory scheme may contribute to noncompliance.
For
example, enforcement of FARA is undermined by overbroad
definitions contained in its provisions. 78 Such definitions lack
sufficient clarity for successful application of FARA, and "[fiailure
of agents to register . . . 'is likely due simply to confusion about
9
7

the provisions of FARA."'
Two areas of FARA have been criticized as failing to provide
adequate bright-line rules. The first involves the treatment of
controlled subsidiaries, ° which is guided by FARA's definition of
"foreign principal,"8 ' whereby agents of the same must register.
Before passage of the LDA, the criticism was leveled that some
agents of entities controlled by foreign principals (that were
"organized, incorporated, and created under the laws of the
United States") were required to register and some were not,
based entirely on advice from the Justice Department. 8 2 The

75.
Perry, supra note 3, at 148. In fact, an agent that balances both the
probability that FARA administrators discover his[or] her foreign agency
relationship and the probability that his [or] her reading of the exemption is
erroneous against the burden of compliance with FARA may choose to risk
nonregistration. By fostering such a calculus, FARA thus fails to effectively
encourage registration. Id.
76.
See Fuller, supra note 67, at 435 (explicating the relevant portions of
the commercial exemption and concluding that the components of the exemption
are subject to ambiguity in application, particularly in the exemption's "more
nuanced applications.").
77.
Perry. supra note 3, at 139.
78.
Id. at 148. It has been suggested that much of the confusion regarding
registration under FARA "stem[s] from the overly expansive and bewildering
definitions in FARA itself." Id.
79.
Id.; see also Fuller, supra note 67, at 436 (suggesting that "Iblecause

the law lacks 'clear guidance as to who is required to register,' many lobbyists
interpret It narrowly and conclude that they need not comply.").
80.
81.
82.

Perry, supra note 3, at 148.
FARA, 22 U.S.C. § 611(b) (1990).
Perry, supra note 3, at 149.
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determination by the Justice Department as to which foreign
principals were to register was criticized as unguided and lacking
a "single firm set of criteria that are uniformly and universally
applied."8 3
Secondly, the broad definition of "political
consultant '8 4 has added to the confusion, possibly resulting in
the under-enforcement of FARA.85 The definition of the term is so
broad that it may require many more parties to register than
originally intended by Congress, which may lead to confusion
regarding the scope of FARA's applicability. 8 6 Such confusion
most likely contributes to noncompliance.
III. REFORM PROPOSALS

The arguments over the need to reform FARA have resulted in
a laundry list of reform proposals. From academic critics 8 7 to the
proposals of legislators, 8 the cries for change and pleas for
closing the purported loopholes in FARA have been perennial.
Until recently, however, such calls produced little legislative
result, as time and again the U.S. legislature seemed to be poised
on the precipice of reform, only to step hastily back from the
brink. 89
Suggested reform measures have generally fallen into three
broad categories. 90 First, some reform proposals seek to simplify
the process of compliance with FARA, thereby lessening the

83.
Id. (quoting 134 CONG. REC. S14,926 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1988)). Agents
are required to register where the "U.S. entity does no real business in the U.S..
existing only to represent a foreign entity." Id. (citing 134 CONG. REc. S14,926
(daily ed. Oct. 6, 1988) (statement of Sen. Heinz). The Senator concluded that

such a "test does not appear in the law or in regulations." Id..
84.
"The term 'political consultant' means any person who engages in
informing or advising any other person with reference to the domestic or foreign
policies of the United States or the political or public interest, policies, or relations
of a foreign country or of a foreign political party." 22 U.S.C. § 6 1l(p).
85.
Perry, supranote 3, at 149.
86.
Id.
87.
See, e.g., Baker, supra note 2; Perry, supra note 3.
88.
See Overhauling the Lobbying Disclosure Laws: Hearings Before the
House Comm. on the Judiciary(September 7, 1995), available in 1995 WL 527076
(F.D.C.H.) [hereinafter Overhauling Hearings] (testimony of Senator Carl Levin, in
which he noted that Congress had tried and failed to reform lobbying registration
laws "[diecade after decade").
89.
See Lobbying Reform Proposals: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on the
Constitutionof the House Comm. of the Judiciary (September 7, 1995), available in
1995 WL 534276 (F.D.C.H.) [hereinafter Report Hearings] (statement of Senator
Carl Levin noting that since the 1940's attempts had been made to reform
lobbying laws and that, as recently as 1994, such a reform bill was passed in the
Senate only to die in the House).
See infra notes 91-132 and accompanying text.
90.
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incentives for noncompliance. Second, other proposals aim at
removing the negative or stigmatic connotations associated with
FARA, bringing FARA more in line with contemporary notions as
to who should be subjected to its strictures, and lessening the
perceived opprobrium attached to registration under it. Third,
numerous proposals strive for general substantive changes in
FARA to make its regulatory regime more effective.
A. Simplifying Compliance with FARA

It is often argued that the difficulty of complying with FARA
has militated against compliance with its registration
requirements. Reformers have thus turned their eyes to this
particular weakness with hopes of stimulating a heightened
degree of compliance through the simplification of the registration
requirement process. The simplification proposals have tended to
focus on either the actual mechanics of registration or the often

bewildering terms of FARA itself.
1. Simplifying the Registration Process
Two principal reform proposals directed at simplifying the
registration process under FARA included the consolidation of all
91
registering and reporting requirements under a single office,
and the implementation of standardized filing dates. 9 2
The
former change was proposed in a reform bill that passed the
93
House of Representatives, but ultimately failed to become law.
The latter was recommended by Senator Heinz in the
amendments to FARA that he proposed in 1988, 9 4 as a method of

91.
See Phil Kuntz, Provisions:Lobbying and Gift Bills Compared, 52 CoNo.
Q. WKLY. REP. 1016, 1016 (April 23, 1994).
92.
Perry, supra note 3, at 151 (citing 134 CONG. REc. S14,926 (daily ed.
Oct. 6, 1988)).
93.
The House bill was S.349 and was only slightly different from a bill
passed by the Senate on May 6, 1993. Both versions aimed at disclosing to the
public "who is being paid how much and by whom to lobby on what issues."
Kuntz, supra note 91, at 1016. The House Bill aimed to remedy the existing state
of affairs that requires lobbyists to register and report at different locations.
Though the bill covered more than foreign agents' obligations to register under
FARA, its simplified reporting provisions would have resulted in a more
straightforward registration process. This reform measure failed ultimately due to
a controversial "grass roots" lobbying provision. Catherine O'Brien, House Feels
Pressure of Lobby Reform After Senate Passes Levin Bill, A. P. POL. SERV., Sept. 9,
1995, availablein 1995 WL 6740547.
94.
Perry, supra note 3, at 151 (citing 134 CONG. REc. S14,926 (daily ed.
Oct. 6, 1988)).
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making the receipt of registration data more
95 orderly and efficient.
This reform initiative, however, also failed.
2. Explicating the Terms of FARA
It is generally considered that the terminology of FARA is
unclear, and that noncompliance may be partly traced to the
inability of those who may be under its mandate to comprehend
their registration responsibilities. 9 6 FARA has been described as
a "byzantine scheme of broad restrictions and numerous
exemptions in which it is difficult to know whether one is obliged
to register."9 7 Clarity of the definitions is critical
under FARA due
98
to the "self-policing" nature of its exemptions.
Enforcement problems arise because individual parties must
decide for themselves (self-police), based on FARA's often
confusing language, whether an exemption applies. 9 9 If they
decide that one does not, they are able to avoid any scrutiny
unless they somehow bring themselves to the attention of FARA's
administrators.10 0 Clarifying FARA's language is only one of a
handful of solutions to resolve such problems. The reforms
suggested include constricting the broad language of FARA,
requiring potential registrants to apply for an exemption to
FARA's reporting requirements (known as the "prior clearance"
approach),' 0 ' and permitting applicants to send a letter to FARA's
02
administrators announcing their intent to rely on an exemption1

95.
Under reporting requirements in force at that time, an agent was
required to file initially when a foreign client was accepted and the agent began
performing "reportable actions." Perry, supra note 3. at 151 (citing 134 CONG.
RFc. S14,926 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1988)). The agent then had to file at six-month
intervals from their original filing date. Consequently, agents' filings poured in
throughout the year because of the marass of original filing dates. The Heinz
proposal would have maintained the initial filing requirement, but would have
required agents to submit subsequent filings on January 15 and July 15. This
would have retained the biannual reporting structure of FARA while allowing a
more timely and orderly receipt of the data, "presumably making compilation of

the data more efficient" and making possible a more "thorough review of the
data." Id. at 151-52.
96.
See generally, Spak, supra note 16.

97.

Id. at 279.

98.

Perry, supra note 3, at 147.

99.
See supra Part II.C. 1 (noting the "self-policing" aspect of FARA).
100. See supra Part II.C.1.
101. Perry, supra note 3, at 158.
102. Spak, supra note 16, at 279. Spak notes that it would be difficult to
constrict the scope of FARA, since foreign agents lobby the U.S. government over
countless issues. Limiting FARA to only specific issues does not seem a desirable
reform. Requiring a mandatory application for exemption has an obvious
downside-the creation of increased paperwork demands on an already overtaxed FARA administrative office-as well as a less obvious disadvantage-
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(an approach labelled as "prior notification").'1 3 Among these
proposals, the clarification approach has the most intuitive appeal
and seems to address the problem directly. "Clarifying the
exemptions would eliminate the need for either obtaining advance
clearance or sending a letter of reliance on an exemption since
individuals would usually be able to readily tell if their activity is
10 4
within the scope of the exemption."

Another measure aimed at elucidating FARA's definitional
confusion was proposed by Senator Heinz. 0 5 Heinz proposed to
add a section to FARA's definition of "foreign principal" that would
provide a clear rule for determining when a foreign principal
maintained control over a domestic entity.'0 8 Heinz asserted that
of the current
such an addition would "eliminate the ambiguity
07
standard," while broadening the reach of FARA. 1
B. Removing the Stigma Associated with Registration
Another element of the literature on reforming FARA
recognizes that current potential registrants are dissuaded from
registering for fear of the stigma still associated with FARA and its
anti-subversive origins, as the original impetus for creating FARA
was the identification of suspected subversive agencies. 10 8 To
reduce the perceived stigma associated with FARA, some have
suggested that its name be changed to remove its "subversive and

businesses who are regarded as potential registrants would have to apply for an
exemption and wait for a decision before conducting foreign dealings. Allowing a
letter of intent to rely on an exemption is a better alternative from a business
perspective, as it would allow the agent to conduct its activities unless a review of
the agents' activities revealed that the exemption did not apply after all. However,
the same difficulties remain with the increased paperwork generated by such an
approach. Id. at 279-80.

103.

Perry, supra note 3, at 158. Perry calls "prior notification" the better

approach as it would increase the total number of foreign agents that were
exposed under FARA while allowing FARA administrators to review the claimed
exemptions as they saw fit-with no comprehensive review of the claimed
exemptions. Perry further argues that such knowledge on the part of agentsthat they must notify the Department of Justice of their intent to rely on an
exemption-will make them less likely to make "conveniently erroneous
judgments of exemption applicability." Id. at 159.
104. Spak, supra note 16, at 280.
105. Perry, supra note 23, at 150-51.
106. Id. The rule urged by Senator Heinz would define foreign control of a
U.S. entity as over 50% ownership of that entity. Ownership of between 20% and
50% of the entity would establish a rebuttable presumption of control, while less
than 20% ownership would be "presumptively not controlling." Id. at 151
(quoting 134 CONG. REc. S14,926 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1988) (statement of Sen.
Heinz).
107. Id.
108. See, e.g., Spak, supra note 16, at 278.

19961

FOREIGN LOBBYISTS AND THE LDA

1171

criminal connotations ... [and] to complement its modern focus
on lobbyists as opposed to subversive propagandists."' 0 9 The
argument is that a removal of the stigma will lead to higher rates
1
of compliance. 0
Other reform proposals to eliminate the stigma of registration
focus on the terms of FARA itself, particularly the terms "foreign
It has been suggested that these
agent," and "propaganda.""1
terms be changed to "representative" and "promotional material"
respectively. 1 2 Changing the terminology in this way would allow
an agent to register under FARA without being labeled as113a
"foreign agent," which could lead to higher rates of compliance.
C. Changing FARA Substantively to Heighten Efficacy
In addition to the less-comprehensive reforms that would
improve FARA through definitional, procedural, and labeling
changes, reform ideas have been proposed that involve significant
substantive changes in FARA and its administrative approach.
These reforms fall into two main groups. One type of reform
suggests substantive changes in FARA itself, while the other
focuses on the enforcement side of the FARA regime and offers
improvements in its ability to carry out its registration imperative.
1. Changing FARA's Substance
The most dramatic substantive change that has been
proposed is that FARA ought to be repealed and its components
divided into "those addressing political subversion and those
Such a division would
addressing economic lobbying."'114

purportedly recognize the changed role of the foreign agent from
the time of FARA's enactment. The sections of FARA relating to
political subversion would be incorporated into existing statutory
schemes in this area, and a new statute would cover only those

109.

Id.

110. Id. Spak asserts that agents would not be as reluctant to register as
"'international information aide[si' as opposed to 'foreign agentis].'" Id. (citing
Congressional Research Service, The Foreign Agents Registration Act, prepared
for the Senate Conmittee on Foreign Relations, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977)).
111. See, e.g., Perry supra note 3, at 159.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 159-60.
114. Baker, supra note 2, at 40. Such a reform was suggested as early as
1973 in Claude-Leonard Davis, Note, Attorneys, Propagandists,and International
Business: A Comment on the ForeignAgents RegistrationAct of 1938, 3 GA. J. INT'L
& COMP. L. 408, 429 n.109 (1973).
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FARA components requiring those who lobby government officials
15
to register.'
Another proposed change that was less sweeping than the
repeal of FARA (but which nonetheless generated a significant
1
level of reaction) was the elimination of the "lawyer" exemption 6
contained in FARA. 1 1 7 This statutory exemption was added in the
1966 amendments to FARA and was intended by Congress to be
limited to attorneys representing foreign clients in proceedings
before a court or a government agency. It did not, for example,
envision embracing those who "attempt[ed] to influence or
persuade agency personnel or officials other than in the course of
established agency proceedings."' 11 8 The expansive interpretation
given by attorneys to the meaning of legal representation,
however, made FARA of little practical effect in this area. 119 The
"significan[t] abuse" of this exemption was evident in the apparent
disregard attorneys had for the registration requirements under
FARA, only adequately reporting thirty percent of the time.' 20
The proposal to eliminate the "lawyer" exemption was
received less than enthusiastically in some quarters. One such
reaction was evident in the testimony of Thomas M. Susmand,
chair of the American Bar Association (ABA) Section of
Administrative Law and Regulatory Practice, before a Senate
subcommittee.
Susmand asserted that such a step would
"needlessly burden the practice of law and undermine fulfillment
of lawyers' professional responsibilities.' 12 1
Despite the
opposition of the ABA, 1 2 2 however, such a reform was officially

115.
Baker, supra note 2, at 40.
116. FARA, 22 U.S.C. § 613(g) (1990).
117. See Rhonda McMillion, Push Is on in Congress to Revamp Lobbying
DisclosureLaws, 78 A.B.A. J. 110, 110 (June 1992) (discussing a bill proposed by
Michigan Democratic Senator Carl Levin (S.2279) to consolidate four existing
disclosure laws so as to make possible the registration of all "professional
lobbyists").
118. Baker, supra note 2, at 27.
119. Id. (asserting that "this exception has swallowed the rule").
120. Id. at 35 (citing 134 CONG. REc. S14,933 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1988)).
121.
Levin's bill addressed such concerns by excluding from the definition
of "lobbying contact" any "communications with regard to ongoing judicial
proceedings, criminal law enforcement proceedings, and any other proceedings
that are required by statute to be conducted on a confidential basis, provided that
such communications are limited to matters that are subject to the proceedings."

Id.
122.
See McMillion, supra note 117, at 110 (indicating the ABA's concern
that elimination of the exclusion would burden lawyers representing foreign
interests, raise problems about the right to counsel and the attorney-client
privilege for foreign persons violate existing U.S. treaty obligations, and invite
retaliatory legislation by other nations against U.S. interests abroad).
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proposed by Senator Heinz. 12 3 Senator Heinz introduced the
reform in 1988 and reintroduced it in 1989, but his proposal
never became law. 124
2. Improving the Enforcement Capabilities Under FARA
Some commentators blame a significant portion of the
noncompliance with FARA on the poor enforcement capabilities of
the FARA administrators.1 25
Various reforms have been
suggested to remedy this situation. It has been suggested, for
example, that one way to deal with FARA's inadequate
enforcement powers is to grant new administrative powers to
FARA.
Two such administrative powers include the implementation
of a schedule of civil fines 126 and the power to subpoena
individuals to "appear, testify or produce records."'127
One
observer contended that stiffening the penalties of noncompliance
is essential to improving the administration of FARA. FARA's
maximum fines were stated to "[in]sufficiently deter individuals

who regularly receive several times that amount for routine
lobbying services," and that either significantly raising the
maximum fines or leaving the fines to a court's discretion was
necessary to create a "genuine deterrent effect upon high-powered
Washington lobbyists."' 28
In addition to increasing the penalties under FARA, the
administrators must be given more enforcement powers. Under
FARA's current embodiment, the FARA office must seek a grand

123.
Perry, supra note 3, at 151.
noting that:

Senator Heinz argued for such a reform

[in the trade area, much of the work of representation is carried on in the
context of formal proceedings such as anti-dumping or countervailing duty
investigations... and other procedures which are formalized in the trade
laws. To exclude this type of activity from reporting is a loophole of some
significance, and in some cases is so broad as to swallow the rule.

Id.
124. Baker, supranote 2, at 37 n.90.
125. See, e.g., Spak, supra note 16, at 275-78; see also Fuller, supra note
67, at 438. "The [Justice] Department's influence [over FARA] is limited 'to
powers of inspection [as to documents of those already registered] and
injunction.'").

126. Perry, supra note 3, at 152. "Civil fines would provide FARA's
administrators with a reasonable way to encourage compliance by fining violators
in proportion to their violations rather than relying on severe criminal sanctions
(or injunctive relief.)" Id. See also Spak, supra note 16, at 277 (urging an
increase in the maximum fine under FARA).

127.

Perry, supranote 3, at 152.

128.

Spak. supra note 16, at 277-78.
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jury investigation to procure compliance. However, "granting the
FARA office the power to summon individuals to appear before it.
. .would do much to expedite the process." 12 9 In fact, without
such an
enlargement of enforcement powers, "any other
amendments to the law will be nugatory." 3 0 While granting these
additional enforcement powers would necessitate an increase in
the staff of the Foreign Agents Registration Office,1 3 ' any
additional cost for such an increase would arguably be offset by
the increased
amount of fines that could be collected with a larger
32
staff.1
W. THE CURRENT ACT-THE LOBBYING DISCLOSURE ACT OF 1995: AN
EVALUATION OF THE EFFICACY OF ITS REFORM PROPOSALS

After years of struggle and numerous failed attempts at
reform, 13 3 the LDA represents a legislative victory of sorts. While

not seen as a complete success by all who labored for its passage
(as it does not contain everything that its sponsors wanted even
though it includes all that they believed could be successfully

included),' 3 4 nearly all concede it is a good bill. 135 On December
19, 1995, President Clinton signed the reform bill into law. In a
statement made on the same date, President Clinton stated:
[The LDA] replaces the existing patchwork of lobbying disclosure
laws with a single, uniform statute that covers the activities of all
professional lobbyists. Among other things, the bill streamlines
lobbyist disclosure requirements and requires that professional
lobbyists register and file regular reports identifying their clients,

129. Id. at 278.
130. Fuller, supra note 67, at 442 (noting that "Itihe Department of Justice
cannot effectively administer FARA without greater authority to Investigate
possible violations").
131. Spak, supra note 16, at 275. "[Under present staffing levels, the officel
is not adequately staffed to monitor compliance and seek corrective action against
those who either fail to register or fail to give accurate disclosure on their
registration statements." Id. See also supra Part II.C. 1.
132. Spak, supra note 16, at 278.
133. Senator Carl Levin, one of the prime movers in the drafting of S 1060,
stated in testimony before the House Committee on the Judiciary that "[diecade
after decade, Congress has tried to close the loopholes in the lobbying registration
laws, and decade after decade, those efforts have failed. This Congress has a
chance to be different." Overhauling Hearings, supra note 88 (testimony of Sen.
Levin).
134. During hearings on the reform proposal, Representative Christopher
Shays stated, "[While ilt is possible to write a better bill. . .I'm not sure Its
possible that we would pass it .... " Reform Hearings,supra note 89.
135. Representative Michael Castle noted that the new law "passed
unanimously in the Senate with the support of major watch dog groups and more
importantly the American public." Id.
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the issues on 6 which they lobby, and the amount of their
13
compensation.
The LDA took effect on January 1, 1996.137
In the context of the regulation of lobbying activities in
general, the new law makes several significant changes,
recognizing the shortcomings of the patchwork of lobbying
disclosure laws that has been the sole mechanism for keeping
track of lobbyists in the United States. 138 The LDA states that
"existing lobbying disclosure statutes have been ineffective
because of unclear statutory language, weak administrative and
enforcement provisions, and an absence of clear guidance as to
who is required to register and what they are required to
disclose." 139
The law further notes that "effective public
disclosure of the identity and efforts of paid lobbyists to influence
Federal officials in the conduct of Government actions will
140
increase public confidence in the integrity of Government."
Under the new law, all lobbyists coming within its scope
must register within forty-five days' 4 1 of the first making of a
lobbying contact, 14 2 the accepting of a client, or the carrying over
of a client from the previous year. 1 43

In registering, a general

statement regarding the content of the registrant's lobbying
efforts is required, and the specific issues already addressed or
likely to be addressed during the lobbying efforts must also be
14 4
disclosed.
In addition to the initial registration requirements, lobbyists
must also make fiscal reports on their activities. 14 5 However, the
required disclosure forms are filed much more uniformly under

the new law. Section 5(a) provides:

136. PresidentialStatement,supra note 13.
137. New Lobby Disclosure Law is Better Suited For 'History' Than for
'Current Events,' POL. FIN. & LOBBY REP., Dec. 13, 1995 available in LEXIS, Legis
Library, Pflrpt File.
138. Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995, 2 U.S.C. § 1601 (Supp. 1996).
139. Id. § 1601(2).
140. Id. § 1601(3). Senator Levin stated, regarding S 1060 [the Senate bill
precursor to the LDA]'s effect on public confidence in government: "The people
want us to change the way we do business in Washington... They want to feel,
and are entitled to feel, that this government is our government." Adam Clymer,
Senate Bill on Lobbying Close to Final Approval But Limits on Gifts Remain
Uncertain,S. F. CHRON., July 25, 1995, at A3 (emphasis added).
141. 2 U.S.C. § 1603 (Supp. 1996)
142. Clinton Signs Lobby Reform Bill Setting New Disclosure Procedures, 13
INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 14 (January 3, 1996).
143. Lobbying, Lobbyists, Hill Officials Prepare For Demands of Lobbying
DisclosureLaw, 1995 DAiLY REP. FOR ExEcuTivEs 237 (Dec. 11, 1995), available in
LEXIS, Exec Library, Drexec File.
144. Id.
145. 2 U.S.C. § 1604(a) (Supp. 1996).-
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[N]o later than 45 days after the end of the semiannual period

beginning on the first day of each January and the first day of July
of each year in which a registrant is registered under section 4,
each registrant shall file a report with the Secretary of the Senate
and the Clerk of the House of Representatives on its lobbying
14 6
activities during such semiannual period.

This provision should prove beneficial as it changes the previous
filing requirement, which had resulted in semiannual filings that
flowed in throughout the entire year, depending on when the
initial filing was made. 14 7 With the uniformity this requirement
brings to the registration process, the processing of the reporting
data will be facilitated and performed in a more orderly fashion.
In a further attempt to simplify registration, the LDA aims to
make the actual filing process of the required registration forms
simpler, thereby enhancing the likelihood of compliance. To that
end, the LDA "significantly streamline[s] lobbying disclosure
requirements by consolidating filing in a single form and a single
location . . .instead of the multiple filings required [under the
previous regulatory regime]." 148
By further simplifying the
reporting requirements, the new law allows the use of "estimates
of total, bottom-line lobbying income" in place of the morecomplex information previously required. 149 A major proponent of
the LDA, Senator Levin, called the detailed information
50
previously required "most[ly] ...meaningless."'
The LDA also clarifies who must register, reducing the
ambiguity of previous broad definitions. For example, the LDA
contains de minimis rules that exempt small organizations from
registration even if occasional contacts are made by their
employees. Individuals spending less than twenty percent of their
time lobbying, and organizations with lobbying expenditures not

exceeding $20,000 a semiannual period, are exempt,' 5 ' Lobbyists
who receive at least $5,000 during a semiannual period from a
52
single client must register. 1
In addition to the foregoing improvements, the LDA
specifically amends FARA with the goal of strengthening its
administration. For example, in accordance with a central goal of

146. Id.
147. See Perry, supra note 3, at 151-52; see also supra Part III.A.l.
148.
OverhaulingHearings, supranote 88 (testimony of Carl Levin).
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id. The goal of the drafters of the LDA was to "avold] imposing any
burden at all on citizens who are not professional lobbyists, but [to] merely
contact the federal government to express their own personal views." Id.
152. Congress, House GOP Leaders to Bring Gift Ban, Lobbying Reform to
Vote, 1995 DAILy REP. FOR ExEcuTwIEs 181 (Sept. 19, 1995), available in LEXIS,
Exec. Library, Drexec File.
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the LDA-broadening the reach of lobbying disclosure
requirements' 5 3-the new law eliminates the exemption for
15 4
lawyers who lobby for foreign companies or their subsidiaries.
Senator Carl Levin, who has fought for lobbying reform for years,

stated that the existing legislation regarding lobbyists was a

"sham and a shamble" and nothing but a "bad joke for everyone
involved," 55 leaving "more professional lobbyists unregistered
than registered."' 5 6 In order to correct this situation, Levin stated
that "[we have eliminated every loophole we [could] get our hands
on," adding that for the first time, lobbyists will be required to
disclose "'who is paying, how much, on what issues."' 15 7 The
elimination of the lawyer exemption was a response to repeated
calls for this reform during past years' 5 8 and is a welcome
change. Lawyers frequently able to avoid registration by
characterizing their work as "legal representation"' 5 9 will now
have to register, permitting a more thorough tracking of the total
amount of
lobbying activities that occur on behalf of foreign
60
interests.'

153.

"The public benefits of more disclosure are undeniable . . .[and] the

new law casts a much wider net [with the result that] . . . [t]housands of

previously unregistered lobbyists . . .will now have to go public." Goldman,
supra,note 8.
154. Adam Clymer, Senators Agree to Increase Lobbyist Reporting: Battle
Remains On Gifts Issue, COM. APPEAL (Memphis), July 25, 1995, at Al, availableIn
LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File. See Infra note 160.
155. Id.
156. O'Brien, supra note 93.
157. Clymer, supra note 154. Senator William Cohen (who along with
Senator Levin was a primary crafter of S 1060 (O'Brien, supra note 93)) warned
that lobbying restrictions should not be too strict: "'There's nothing wrong with
lobbying. It's not an evil thing. . . We want lobbyists to register, but let's not
chill protected constitutional rights [such as the right to petition the government]
in the process.'" Id.
158. See supra notes 129-36 and accompanying text.
159. FARA, 22 U.S.C. § 613(g) (1990) provided:
Any person qualified to practice law, insofar as he engages or agrees
to engage in the legal representation of a disclosed foreign principal before
any court of law or any agency of the Government of the United States:
Provided, That for the purposes of this subsection legal representation
does not include attempts to influence or persuade agency personnel or
officials other than in the course of established agency proceedings,
whether formal or informal (emphasis deleted and added).
See Baker, supra note 2, at 27 (regarding the expansive use made of this
exemption by lawyers).
160. Under the LDA, the phrase "establishing agency proceedings, whether
formal or informal" in 22 U.S.C. § 613(g) is struck and is replaced by "Judicial
proceedings, criminal or civil law enforcement inquiries, investigations, or
proceedings, or agency proceedings required by statute or regulation to be
conducted on the record." 2 U.S.C. § 1609(2) (Supp. 1996).
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Another change made by the LDA that has been heralded by

the lobbying community consists of the removal of foreign
companies from the jurisdiction of FARA. 16

1

At present, corporate

filings make up nearly half of all FARA registrations, which take
hours to complete due to the detailed information required by the
Justice Department.1 6 2 Critics of this change, however, such as
Justice Department officials, claim that it "undercuts critical
scrutiny of foreign influence on domestic affairs." 163 In response,
lobbyists argue that overseas companies that are not "trying to
subvert American government policy" in the global marketplace,
and who often have U.S. subsidiaries, should be treated no
differently than domestic firms. 164
Indeed, in this era of global competition, it is not realistic to
expect foreign companies doing business with the United States
to avoid attempting to influence U.S. policy in their favor. As a
system with many potential points of entry for those seeking to
influence its policy apparatus, the U.S. political structure must
recognize that it is uniquely vulnerable to such efforts. However,
instead of unduly burdening foreign corporations, a sensible and
workable plan of registration should be nurtured and
maintained. 165 This will provide the United States with both the
security it seeks and the prosperity born of increased competition
166
that it deserves.
161. Goldman, supranote 8.
162. The Justice Department requires color-coded pages of information on
principals who have left or joined the firm in the preceding six months,
accountings of campaign contributions, and copies of lobbying contracts. These
demands have been said to represent "taking bureaucracy to new heights." Id.
(quoting Thomas Susman, editor of a how-to lobbying manual).
163. Id.
164. Id. It is clear that there are limits to what disclosure may reveal
regarding the true influence of private money upon the public. Ellen Miller, of the
Center for Responsive Politics, asserts that disclosure alone is not enough to
change business as usual. According to Miller, what is needed is a crossreferencing of the disclosure information with campaign contributions In order to

determine which legislator Is receiving donations from whom "to draw a closer
link with whose interests are really being represented." Id.
165. Even though foreign companies and trade associations are exempt
from the highly detailed reporting requirements under FARA, they still must file
under the same guidelines as everyone else. Id. This makes such foreign firms
subject to potential civil fines of up to $50,000 for a violation of registration
requirements, as provided for in the LDA. Id.
166. There is some concern remains that FARA registrants will seek to
make use of a provision in the new law which waives FARA's more stringent
disclosure requirements for those becoming LDA registrants.
Loopholes for
Lobbyists:
Some Provisions of New Registration Law Have 'Unintended
Consequences,' POL. FIN. LOBBY REP., Feb. 14, 1996, available In LEXIS, Legis
Library, Pflrpt File.
However, Frederick J. Close, Jr., acting chief of the
registration unit in the Justice Department's Internal Security Division, noted
that "[tlhe new law says you must be required to register under (the] LDA in order
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The removal of foreign companies from FARA's jurisdiction is
likely to have an efficacious impact on the administration of
FARA. The LDA's positive impact in this regard will derive from
the added guidance as to which agents of foreign entities must
register.1 6 7 Now, only lobbyists for foreign governments must file
16 8
FARA reports.
Further, compliance with FARA's registration imperative is
likely to improve due to new provisions that focus on simplifying
the registration process. For example, the LDA waives FARA's
disclosure requirement for foreign agents who register as
lobbyists on Capitol Hill. 1 69 This waiver has the effect of allowing
foreign agents to avoid a FARA requirement that registrants

disclose any formal contracts with their clients.17 0 This change is
likely to lessen any disincentive to register by reducing the
registration requirements that existed under FARA's prior
regulatory regime. Though falling short of actually consolidating
all registration requirements under a single office, 17 1 the change
is nonetheless a needed simplification.
In response to one of the most vociferous criticisms of FARA
in recent years, 1 72 the new law also makes a significant
definitional change to FARA. Regarding the section of FARA
defining "political activities,"'1 7 3 the new law strikes the confusing
language that prohibited "the dissemination of political
propaganda and any other activity which the person engaging
therein believes will, or which he intends to, prevail upon,

to get the FARA exemption." Id. (emphasis added) (internal quotations omitted).
Further, the new law does not change the Justice Department rule requiring
FARA registrants to obtain permission before terminating a FARA reporting
obligation. Close explained, "Foreign agents who want to register under the
Lobbying Disclosure Act will be required to terminate their FARA registrations.
We will determine from their [termination] applications if their LDA registration is
valid[.I" Id. (internal quotations omitted). Thus, oversight of FARA registrants will
continue and fears of foreign agents escaping scrutiny by electing LDA
registration seem unwarranted.
167. See supra Part II.C.3.
168.
Goldman, supra note 8.
169. New Lobby Disclosure Law, supra note 137.
170. Id. Regarding this provision in the new law, Edward Zuckerman stated
that the law represents the "'replacelment of] a bad disclosure law with a law that
fails to deliver on a promise of full disclosure' . . . [and in fact discourages
disclosure."
Frank Greve, Critics Find Loopholes In Senate Lobby Reform,
DisclosureMeasure, THE CHARLESTON GAZETTE, August 22, 1995, at 5A, available in
LEXIS, News Library, Cumws File. Ann McBride, president of Common Cause, a
group that lobbied for the reform law, disagrees asserting that "'the current
disclosure law is a Joke... [a]nd to say that this is a step backward from it is

baloney'." Id.
171.

See supra Part III.A.1 (noting such a proposed consolidation).

172.

See supra notes 112-17 and accompanying text.

173.

FARA, 22 U.S.C. § 611(o) (1990 & Supp. 1996).
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indoctrinate, convert, induce, persuade, or in any other way
influence [the U.S. government in its policies toward a foreign
country or political party]."' 7 4 In place of this language is
inserted the following phrase:
"Any activity that the person
engaging in believes will, or that the person intends to, in any way
influence [those policies]." 175

Additionally, the term "political

propaganda" has been replaced by the term "informational
materials" in several different sections of FARA. 17 6 In other
sections, references
to "political propaganda" have simply been
77
eliminated. 1

These definitional changes represent a good start at
addressing
the stigma associated with registration under
FARA.1 78 Eliminating the "political propaganda" language brings
FARA more in line with contemporary notions of the sources and
intentions of foreign influence. Such language, reminiscent of a
time when the United States feared the influence of the

subversive elements of hostile foreign governments dedicated to
harming U.S. interests, is out of step with modern lobbying efforts
which seek to influence the outcome of the legislative processes of
the United States.
Nonetheless, some of the stigma associated with FARA
remains. FARA is still titled in such a way as to suggest its focus
has not changed as much as the current amendment. In addition
to the laudable definitional changes to FARA, its title should also
be changed to reflect its new focus. For example, "The Foreign
Lobbyists Registration Act" would be a simple change, reflective of
its purpose, while less stigmatizing than the current reference to
"foreign agents.'' 179 Such changes aimed at reducing the stigma
associated with FARA are crucial. Not only are such changes
necessary to reflect the current environment in which FARA

174.
175.
176.
177.

Id.
2 U.S.C. § 1609(1)(B) (1990 & Supp. 1996).
Id. § 1609(4)-(6).
Id. § 1609(7)-(8).

178. Some observers, however, question why references to "political
propaganda" were removed from FARA given the Justice Department's successful
defense of the use of the term before the U.S. Supreme Court. Loopholes For
Lobbyists, supranote 166.
179. U.S. Representative James A. Traflcant, Jr., has proposed a measure
aimed at toughening registration requirements for foreign lobbyists. A central
part of this measure is the substitution of the term "representative of a foreign
interest" for "foreign agent." Press Release, March 22, 1996, James Traflcant,

Congressman, House, Traflcant Urges House JudiciaryPanel To Toughen Rules On
Foreign Lobbyists, Congressional Press Releases [hereinafter Traficant Press
Release] available in 1996 WL 8784791.
This alteration will broaden the
definition, presumably closing a loophole. Id. It will have the additional effect of
lessening the stigma associated with registration under FARA, thereby making

potential registrants less averse to such registration. See supra Part III.B.
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operates, the reduction of the negative associations is essential to
maximize compliance with its registration imperatives,
1 80
particularly due to the self-policing nature of its provisions.
Another positive change made by the new law requires former
U.S. trade representatives or deputies to be banned for life from
lobbying. 18 1 This makes former government officials unable to
peddle their influence upon their one-time co-workers in the U.S.
government on behalf of foreign interests. 18 2 This change reflects
the different world in which FARA must operate today. Lobbyists

are not capitalizing on anonymity, as did the past propagandists,
but are instead shopping themselves as a desired
commodity to
83
foreign interests because they are well known.1
Although the LDA represents an important step forward in
lobbying reform, much more remains to be done. The law did not,
for example, address one of the most serious problems with the
administration of FARA-that of understaffmg. The new law
neglected to provide for new personnel, a failing that is likely to
become problematic if the law accomplishes its goal of increasing
the number of registrants. Such an increase would severely tax
an already overworked staff. Although registration levels may rise
initially, as FARA's resources are spread increasingly thin,
potential registrants are likely to evade the scrutiny that could be
provided by more robust staffing levels.
Similarly, while the new law aims to increase the level of
registration under FARA, the LDA failed to adequately address the
need for increased enforcement powers in the office of the
Department of Justice. Ifthere is to be any realistic hope of a
true increase in the number of foreign agents registering as
required, the administrators of FARA must be given the power
necessary to compel compliance. As long as the administrators
lack the ability to even properly assess compliance,' 8 4 such as by
subpoenaing individuals to determine if the requisite registration

180. See supra Part II.C.1 (regarding the "self-policing nature" of FARA) and
III.A.2 (noting reforms aimed at strengthening this aspect of FARA).
181. Warren P. Strobel, Clinton Says Lobby-Reform Bill Will 'Pull Back the

Curtains': Measure Reflects BipartisanConsensus, Has Major Curbs, WASH.

TIMES,

Dec. 20, 1995, at AS, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File.
182. Senate Majority Leader Robert Dole stated that the "appearance of a
revolving door between government service and private sector enrichment" was a
problem, one that was "exacerbated when former government officials work on
behalf of foreign interests." Senate Lobbying Reform Bill Bars Foreign Lobbying by
USTR, Deputies, 12 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 34, at 1423 (Aug. 23, 1995).
183. See supra Part II.C. (noting the problem with such officials
working for foreign interests).
184. See Fuller, supra note 67 (recommending increased authority for FARA
administrators to "investigate possible violations").
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procedures have been followed, 185 the enforcement arm of FARA
will remain largely impotent.
Another significant gap in the administration of FARA that
was not addressed by the LDA is that of the self-policing nature of
FARA and its exemptions. Though the LDA eliminates the lawyer
exemption, other exemptions 8 6 remain which continue to be selfapplied.' 8 7 This oversight allows those potentially subject to
FARA's registration requirements to avoid registration by

determining that one of the exemptions applies to them.

A

further step is thus needed to ensure that the exemptions are
validly applied. For instance, potential registrants should be
required to notify FARA administrators in advance of their
intention to rely on one of the exemptions, allowing the Justice
Department to decide if a review is necessary. Without such a
notification requirement, FARA administrators cannot reasonably
be expected to monitor compliance as those parties, who
determine on their own initiative whether they come within an
exemption, simply avoid detection.
A further shortcoming in the effort to reform FARA consists of
the LDA's failure to address the punitive aspects of FARA. While
the LDA provides for civil fines of up to $50,000 for a violation of
its registration requirements, these civil fines are not applicable to
those who violate the registration imperatives of FARA. 18 8 This
was a costly oversight because one of the perennial problems with
enforcement derives from the reluctance of administrators to
impose the criminal penalties available under FARA upon
violators.' 8 9 Unless FARA's enforcement mechanism is modified

185. See supra notes 129-32 and accompanying text.
186. One example is the "commercial exemption" provided for in FARA. See
Fuller, supra note 67, at 434 (noting that the relevant section of that exemption
applies "to agents making only routine contacts with government officials on
matters not concerning policy formulation." It excuses "lalny person engaging or
agreeing to engage only (1) in private and nonpolitical activities in furtherance of
the bona fide trade or commerce of such foreign principal; or (2) In other activities

not serving predominately a foreign Interest.'") (citing 22 U.S.C. § 613(d) (1988))
(footnotes and first citation omitted). A bill by U.S. Representative. Traficant
would eliminate this exemption by requiring "any person who engages in political
activities for the purpose of furthering the commercial or financial operation of a
foreign interest" to register. Traflcant Press Release, supra note 180.
187. See supra notes 98-104 and accompanying text (describing the "selfpolicing" nature of the exemptions).
188. FARA, 22 U.S.C. § 618(a)(2) (1990) provides that violators may be
"punished by a fine of not more than $10,000" while LDA, 2 U.S.C. § 1060(2)
(Supp. 1996) provides that noncompliance may be punished by a "civil fine of not
more than $50,000."
189. See Press Release, May 10, 1996, Charles Canady, Congressman
House, Canady Introduces Bill To Restrict Revolving Door Lobbying, Congressional
Press Releases [hereinafter Canady Press Release], available in 1996 WL 8786700
("Currently, only criminal penalties are provided for in FARA, and the Justice
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to provide a schedule of civil fines for violations of its registration
mandate, in addition to the criminal sanctions already

provided, 190 it is unlikely that those who scorn their registration
duty will be punished. Only punishment will deter future
disregard of FARA's registration requirements. So long as FARA
administrators are reluctant to impose the severe criminal
penalties available under FARA, the continuing absence of civil
fines for such violations seems to send potential registrants the
message that they can ignore FARA's guidelines with impunity. 19 1
V. CONCLUSION

The LDA represents the first successful attempt in decades to
reform the regulatory apparatus of FARA. It was the product of a
bipartisan effort that recognized the practical limitations of the
legislative process itself on any reform process of this nature. The
passage of the LDA is a testament to the diligent efforts of its
sponsors and to the cumulative impact of the calls for reforms
made by scholars and legislators alike for many years.
The changes made to FARA by the LDA are consistent with
the reforms supported by both academics and political reformers.
The elimination of the references to "foreign propaganda," while
not entirely sufficient to eliminate the stigma associated with
registration, constitutes a commendable step. Such a change
brings FARA into the new era of global competition, where the
impact of foreign interests is felt, not in subversive propaganda,
but in the efforts of well-heeled lobbyists who bring their
influence to bear on the U.S. government. The effort to increase
the simplicity and uniformity of filing under FARA is likewise
laudable. The elimination of the lawyer exemption and the

Department has been unwilling to enforce the statute due to the strict criminal

penal sanctions involved.").
190. See Fuller, supra note 67, at 438 (noting that FARA's "criminal
provisions for noncompliance are not an effective threat. Such a charge Is hard to
substantiate because intent to violate [FARA] must be established, so
administrators rely on civil [or] injunctive remedies instead.").
191. This shortcoming of FARA has been duly recognized and bills seeking
to correct this deficiency in FARA's enforcement machinery have already been
drafted. For example, Representative Canady has proposed the addition of civil
fines to FARA which mirror those in the LDA. For each knowing violation of the
registration requirements of FARA, a civil penalty of not more than $50,000 may

be imposed.

Canady Press Release, supra note 189.

A bill proposed by

Representative Traflcant. provides for much stiffer civil penalties: "[AMny person
who has failed to file, omitted facts, or made a false statement regarding the facts,
[may be subject] to a minimum fine of $2,000, and a maximum fine of
$1,000,000." Traficant Press Release, supra note 179.
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closing

of the revolving-door

regarding

former U.S.

trade

representatives also constitute necessary reform.
Though several key aspects of FARA were unfortunately left
unaddressed, the positive changes the LDA made to FARA should
increase foreign agent registration. Such changes will allow FARA
administrators to track down a large number of previously
unregistered lobbyists. The success of the LDA in bringing more
lobbyists under FARA's registration imperative, however, also
points to its greatest shortcomings. While registration is expected
to rise, FARA administration staff levels and enforcement powers
remain insufficient under the LDA.
Therefore, it is unclear
whether the already strained staff will be able to maintain an
adequate level of supervision of increased numbers of registered
foreign lobbyists. Only when the additional step of bolstering the
ranks and powers of the administration staff is taken may one
truthfully assert that the light of public scrutiny will shine on
those who seek to influence U.S. governmental processes.
CharlesLawson*
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to Daniel Y. Jun for his tireless efforts and sage advice in the early

stages of this Note.

